Western University

Scholarship@Western
Political Science Publications

Political Science Department

6-1999

Canada and the UN Security Council: New
Strategies to Advance International and National
Security
Erika Simpson
Political Science, simpson@uwo.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/politicalsciencepub
Part of the Political Science Commons
Citation of this paper:
Simpson, Erika, "Canada and the UN Security Council: New Strategies to Advance International and National Security" (1999).
Political Science Publications. 82.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/politicalsciencepub/82

Erika Simpson, "Canada and the UN Security Council: New Strategies to Advance International and
National Security," Peace Research, vol. 31, no. 2, June 1999, pp. 79-99.

Canada and the UN Security Council:
New Strategies to Advance International
and National Security
Erika Simpson
Political Science, University of Western Ontario
London, Canada
Introduction
The end of the Cold War led to vastly reduced tensions between the United States
and the former Soviet Union. Yet the new era has been marked by the rise of ethnic and
religious disputes, as well as tendencies to resort to unilateral and isolationist measures.
Such an ongoing tumult of change necessitates that traditional policies be seriously
reconsidered and, perhaps, drastically reevaluated. Old ways of thinking no longer apply
to the world we live in. As a country that has historically proposed new ways of thinking
about international security1, Canada is well-placed to help usher in new approaches.
This article suggests some strategies that Canada could pursue while it is a member of the
United Nations (UN) Security Council over the next eighteen months.2

Canada’s Approach at the UN toward Peacekeeping
Enhance Canada’s Peacekeeping Reputation:
Canada’s peacekeeping role through the UN is justifiably a great source of
national pride for Canadians. In the past, peacekeeping helped develop a positive
reputation for Canada. It also distinguished Canadians from Americans, who until
recently did not participate in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping allowed Canada to
assert an independent role in the international arena and came to reflect distinctively
Canadian values. “Canadians have always seen peacekeeping as an important part of
their identity and of their country’s position on the international stage, even when
peacekeeping meant little to much of the international community.”3
Yet during the 1990s, peacekeeping became the subject of an unrelenting crossexamination by the media and the public. It became difficult to perceive Canadian
peacekeepers as heroes in situations—especially with the revelation of the murder of a

Somali teen in a Canadian camp. The Liberal government under Prime Minister Jean
Chretien can be faulted for having failed to get to the bottom of the imbroglio.
Complicating matters further, the reputation of some members of the Department of
National Defence (DND) was marred and some were accused of a cover-up. Moreover,
former Defence Minister Doug Young abruptly ended an inquiry the Liberals themselves
had established. What could the government do to improve the Canadian Forces’
approach to peacekeeping, and thus enhance Canada’s reputation at the UN Security
Council for peacekeeping?
•

The Canadian Forces’ preparations for peacekeeping are insufficient and ad hoc.
Until recently, the Forces relied on little training and scant peacekeeping doctrine; the
emphasis was upon combat-capability. The Canadian government should ensure that
all ranks of the Canadian Forces receive increased training in conflict resolution
and negotiation skills so as to help avert dangerous situations before combat skills
become necessary. The more peacekeeping operations combine military and
humanitarian objectives, the more combat capabilities will diminish in importance.
This is not to say that Canadian peacekeepers should not receive any multi-purpose,
combat-capable training. Simply that all ranks, not just officers, need more
peacekeeping training.

•

The Canadian government should ensure that the Defence Department spends
significantly more on peacekeeping. The difficulties that the DND is experiencing
within the current budget are not a result of the cost of peacekeeping operations. The
incremental cost of such operations is $100-150 million a year—roughly the same
amount as the government spends on the Air Cadet, Army Cadet, and Sea Cadet
youth programmes.4

• Other countries, including the United States, are participating more heavily in
peacekeeping than in the past. If the Canadian government wishes to continue to be
taken seriously at the UN, as a valued voice on the future of peacekeeping, it should
increase Canada’s current commitment to peacekeeping, relative to the rest of the
world. Canada must not rest on its laurels as other countries develop more expertise.
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Improve Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre:
Canada could do more to help UN member states adjust to rapid changes in the
nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping duties now include the monitoring and
administration of elections, preventive deployment, humanitarian and human rights
functions, the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions, and nation-building
mandates. The burden of peacekeeping for the UN has dramatically increased over the
1990s—and Canada is well-positioned to ensure that new UN Security Council initiatives
reflect this new reality. This middle power has valuable experience and knowledge that
could be used to reshape the UN and other multilateral institutions in the new era.
However, Canadian institutions and peacekeeping infrastructure remain much the same in
Canada as they were during the Cold War, despite the explosion of new operations.
•

The promising concept of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International
Peacekeeping Training Centre must be fully developed and implemented as its
original architects intended.5 The Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre is currently
only a shell of what it could be. The Chretien government arguably implemented it
purely for electoral purposes, not to make real changes to the military’s approach to
peacekeeping.

•

The Canadian government must ensure that the Pearson Peacekeeping Training
Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia becomes widely regarded as one of the best
peacekeeping training centres in the world, an invaluable resource for the
Canadian Forces, Defence Department, and peacekeepers worldwide. It must become
a centre of learning for all ranks--not just a place for officers and civilians to share
peacekeeping ideas and experiences.

In the 1993 election campaign, the Liberals expressed their intent, if elected, to
strengthen Canada’s leadership role in international peacekeeping. They intended to do
this, in part, through a reorientation of Canadian defence policy and procurement
practices to emphasize the key priority of peacekeeping. The Liberals also promised to
give priority to Canadian efforts to improve the UN’s policies on peacekeeping. The
government claimed to be committed to multilateralism and world citizenship through
participation in peacekeeping. 6 Over the last seven years, however, Canada’s
3

peacekeeping reputation has not increased but suffered from declining morale and an
endless mire of questions and recrimination. There has been little, if any, progress toward
these original goals.

• If the Canadian government wants to be taken seriously at the UN Security Council,
it needs to act quickly to rejuvenate faith and support in the Canadian Forces by
enacting a defence policy in favour of peacekeeping and multilateralism, not
isolationism and tacit support of American unilateralism.

Canada’s Attitude at the UN toward UN Finances
Press UN Members to pay Dues on Time:
The UN continues to experience a funding crisis due to member states’ failure to
honour their financial obligations. Member states of the UN invest an average of $1.40 in
UN peacekeeping activities for every $1000 spent on their own armed forces. For
example, for every dollar that it has invested in UN peacekeeping, the United States has
tended to spend over $2000 on its own military.7 In fact, the UN’s entire 1995
peacekeeping budget was less than 1 percent of the $868 billion in military spending by
all the governments of the world combined.8
Where should Canada stand on the issue of UN finances? Canada has consistently
paid its regular and peacekeeping dues to the UN. It is time to press other member states
to enact Article 19 of the UN Charter. This article states that a member which is in
arrears for more than two years shall be barred from having a vote in the General
Assembly.
•

Canada should vigorously press members of the General Assembly to enact
Article 19 against recalcitrant members of the UN General Assembly and the
Security Council. Although Canada is the United States’ closest ally, friendship
should not blind it to the fact that the US owes approximately $1.3 billion dollars to
the UN’s regular budget and the peacekeeping budget.9

•

Canadian officials should consider threatening to halt payment for the costs of
NATO enlargement until the United States agrees to its fair share of UN spending.
If high-level American officials admonish Canadians for reduced spending on
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defence, Canadians should remind them of the United States’ failure to pay its UN
dues.

Canada’s Approach in the UN Security Council toward European Security
Ensure Significant NATO Reform:
Many people refer to the UN as a fifty-year old institution in need of reform. But
NATO is also a middle-aged institution in need of reform. Wholesale reform will not
work. Reforms must be cumulative, built gradually on existing foundations. For instance,
the decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance is one
kind of reform. The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Council and the NATO-Russia
Founding Act are others. But NATO needs further transformation of its structures and
procedures if it is to serve the common security interests of the allies and others.
•

Canada’s first priority should be not to create new dividing lines. A reformed NATO,
which did not aim to include the most powerful country in Europe, Russia, would be
fatally flawed. The Canadian government should strive to engage NATO and Russia
in an active, cooperative relationship that would form the cornerstone of a new,
inclusive security structure in Europe. Canada must act quickly through the UN and
other multilateral institutions, such as the G-8 and the International Monetary Fund,
to invite Russia into Western security and economic structures.

•

NATO’s air attack on Serbia and Kosovo has made it even more imperative that the
alliance makes a supreme effort to welcome Russia into European decision-making
circles. Russia has suspended all contacts with NATO and taken its soldiers in Bosnia
from under NATO command. Russia’s decision to step back from involvement in
NATO, within hours of the attack on the former Yugoslavia, is further indication that
the provisions of the NATO-Russia Founding Act are insufficiently attractive for
Russia to remain engaged in discussions at Brussels. Russia will need more
incentives and more reassurance. And Canada with its large expatriate Russian,
Ukrainian, and Serbian populations is well-equipped to promote stronger ties.
Through UN and NATO auspices, Canada should press the allies within NATO to
reassure Russia by offering it a special relationship in NATO. Incentives could
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include formally embedded consultation mechanisms, a mutual non-aggression
pledge, and a promise to develop non-offensive defence systems.

It needs also to be remembered that the first round of NATO expansion took place in
the spring of 1999 without widespread Russian approval. We continue to run the risk of
inciting old hatreds and new insecurities. The Russian leadership remains unstable.
General Alexander Lebed waits impatiently in the background. Consequently, the
Canadian government should refrain from pushing for a second round of NATO
enlargement. Rather than suggest that Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Baltic
countries be invited into the alliance, Canada should hold-back. To urge further NATO
expansion beyond Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic would contribute to the
situation Canada does not want—a more paranoid and insecure Russian leadership and
population. The alliance should postpone any decisions about new members to avoid
further tensions with Russia, a strong opponent of the air war against Yugoslavia and of
NATO expansion.
•

Canada should counsel the United States and the other NATO allies to delay opening
the door to further NATO enlargement until the Russian leadership considers
that it is an integral part of Europe’s emerging security architecture.

•

The Canadian government could also re-emphasize at the UN the objectives
underlying NATO’s Article 2, which recommends in part that the allies contribute
toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations,
strengthen their free institutions, promote conditions of stability and well-being, and
encourage economic collaboration. The Canadian government should emphasize the
ideas embodied in that article, and help transform NATO from a collective defence
organization into an alliance of free and democratic nations intent upon ending
East-West confrontation.
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Canada’s Approach in the UN Security Council toward Asserting Sovereignty
New Ways to Assert Arctic Sovereignty:
Canadians cannot afford to sit idly by while their sovereignty in the Arctic is
undermined. Yet Canada’s concept of asserting Arctic sovereignty must move away from
the traditional notion of defending the North against ‘threats,’ such as the former Soviet
Union, towards an emphasis on sovereignty association very broadly defined. The skies
above the Arctic have decreased, not increased, in strategic significance, as have
Northern waters. Canada should police its Arctic territory, skies, and waters, but the way
in which the government asserts sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago needs to be reexamined.
•

The Canadian government could consider purchasing a few previously-used
icebreakers from Russia, ones that are capable of penetrating Arctic ice that is at
least eight feet thick. According to the Canadian Coast Guard, its fleet of six
icebreakers is only operational in the north during the summer months from July to
November.10 Some second-hand non-nuclear Russian icebreakers would be able to
assert effective control of Arctic waters year-round. The Canadian Coast Guard and
Canadian Navy could use the icebreakers to navigate Arctic waters during the winter
season, thus enhancing Arctic sovereignty in a peaceful and responsible fashion.

Some have argued that diesel submarines are essential tools to assert sovereignty.
But diesel submarines promise to be an ill-considered choice. The four used British
Upholder Class submarines that the Liberal government plans to acquire between 2000
and 2002 will probably have to be expensively refitted, at an additional cost of
approximately $1.27 billion (Cdn), in order to extend the life of their equipment and to
operate under Arctic ice. Add to that the original purchase price of $750 million and
Canada has a submarine programme that may cost it more than $2 billion.11
The argument that the submarines are necessary to protect Canada’s security and
sovereignty underwater is less than persuasive, if not another red herring. Even at the
height of the Cold War (when there was a credible threat), officials could not be sure of
what was happening in all of Canada’s territorial waters, particularly in the Arctic. They
had to assume that there were occasional intrusions by our allies and others. However,
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these were not sufficient to undermine Canadian sovereignty or security. Even if the
Upholder submarines happen to detect or intercept an intruder, Canada’s options will
remain exceedingly limited. Officials might get on the ‘diplomatic horn’ and complain.
They might ‘ping’ the offending submarine with sonar and ask it to leave. Or, as a last
resort, they could respond with force by launching a wire-guided torpedo, risking
retaliation and potential escalation. No Canadian government would consider this option
in peacetime.
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of the British Upholder submarine as a multipurpose resource that provides the wide range of options and secondary service that was
advertised. In fact, these subs will have fairly narrow operational limitations. They are of
little use in waving the flag and demonstrating a presence for sovereignty protection.
They are seldom helpful in search and rescue operations. They have yet to be needed in
any peacekeeping mission. Further, their purported contributions to surveillance,
monitoring, and fisheries protection roles can be far more cost-effectively performed by
other means. The Aurora aircraft, for example, can cover considerably more territory in
less time at less expense. In short, so far no one has demonstrated a compelling scenario
or a convincing case for buying the submarines.12
•

The Canadian government needs to take a more pro-active (and less expensive)
approach at the UN toward asserting Arctic sovereignty and managing our territory
wisely. Canada should not militarize the North, merely increase its presence there.
Purchasing and operating more icebreakers in the circumpolar north, rather than
refitting the diesel submarines, would be a cost-effective and peaceful method of
doing so.

Canada’s Approach at the UN toward New Security Threats and Challenges:
Reconsidering the Nature of the Threat:
The UN Security Council needs to reconsider and reevaluate perceived threats to
the international community. Who is threatened, by whom, and how? For a while, the
fact that there was no longer a significant Soviet threat implied that security could be
preserved at much lower levels of defence spending. Now the threat from Saddam
Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic has led to calls, especially by some Americans, for

8

greater defence spending. US President Bill Clinton plans to increase the defence budget
this year by hundreds of billions of dollars, in the largest hike in peacetime history.13
Most recently, the US Ambassador to Canada had the temerity to lecture Canadians about
the need to increase their defence spending.14
Rather than respond in a knee-jerk fashion to the United States’ remonstrations,
Canada should implement new kinds of defence preparations that are considered vital to
Canadian—and concomitantly the international community’s—concerns. The
government needs to think carefully about how it will spend its defence dollars and
where: Is there any need to prepare for high-intensity conflict, as Canada did during the
Cold War, and still does? When and how should the country contribute to UN-sanctioned
mid-intensity conflicts, such as the Gulf War? What kinds of Canadian defence
preparations might be perceived as offensive and provocative, rather than defensive and
necessary? Canada’s parliament has recently released a report calling for a reexamination of NATO’s reliance on nuclear deterrence and the New Strategic Concept.15
Many other similarly pressing security issues loom on the horizon. Questions are already
being raised about how much Canada should contribute to the costs of NATO
enlargement.16 More defence spending may also be deemed necessary if the government
decides to become deeply involved in American space initiatives and ballistic missile
defence.
•

The Canadian government needs to reconsider all these sorts of questions in light
of the new types of threats and challenges the international community now faces.
During its tenure as a UN Security Council member, the government should hold a
nation-wide security forum designed to solicit all types of Canadian opinion on
these sorts of important questions. Rather than sponsor intermittent conferences,
where academics, graduate students, and representatives of Non-Governmental
Organizations meet for a few hours at great expense due to high travel and
accommodation costs, a web-site on the Internet could be used to democratize the
discussion and promote nation-wide participation. The website could be
sponsored and maintained by the Privy Council Office, in conjunction with
information officers from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
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Trade and the Department of National Defence, however, it would be open to all
Canadians.

For decades Canada’s assessment of the threat has been shaped and influenced by
American military threat analysis. It can be argued that it is time for Canada to undertake
more of its own independent military threat analysis.17
•

The government needs to institute the infrastructure and procedures necessary for
Canada to carry out its own independent threat analysis under the auspices of
Canadian security institutions such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and the Defence
Department. In conjunction with UN monitoring agencies and international watchdog
institutes, Canada could unite with like-minded nations to provide the UN Security
Council with timely and accurate threat assessments based on new information
(and possibly conflicting analyses of the threat). Such alternative threat assessments
might play a valuable role in ameliorating tensions and defusing arms spirals in the
weeks and months preceding possible multilateral or unilateral actions, such as air
strikes.

Threats to North American Security:
The decline of the Soviet threat has also meant that the North American
Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is no longer as important to Canadian security.
Some argue that the war against illicit narcotics is ongoing, and that the Canadian
military must work through NORAD to interdict drugs. To some extent, this argument
serves to quell questions about the future purpose and intentions of NORAD.
Nevertheless, concerns are being raised about Canada’s possible contribution to the US
military’s global surveillance, warning, and communications systems.18 The government
needs to be especially careful that it is not perceived to be intent upon erecting some kind
of ‘Fortress America.’
•

The Canadian government should maintain its official position of nonparticipation
in active missile and space-based defence programs. Canadian officials need to
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assure other countries that there is no anti-ballistic missile system in any way
connected to the NORAD agreement.
•

Canada should re-emphasize its commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
and, if it chooses to stay in NORAD over the long-term, the government must ensure
that aspects of the missile defense program associated with NORAD do not violate
the ABM Treaty.

Nuclear and Conventional Challenges to Canada and the World’s Security
The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation:
Fears of instability in Russia have been heightened by the ailing health of
President Yeltsin, Russia’s falling ruble, the possibility of widespread food shortages, as
well as the threat of political extremism. The possibility of nuclear weapons falling into
the wrong hands has never been greater. As Russian General Aleksandr Lebed recently
told President Clinton during his visit to Moscow, Russia today faces a greater threat than
in 1917 on the eve of the Russian Revolution. As Lebed warned, “the situation is worse
than in 1917. Now we have huge stockpiles of poorly guarded nuclear weapons.”19
Desperate conditions exist in nuclear cities and biological institutes across Russia.
Moreover, weapons scientists and engineers are not being paid. The sale of nuclear
weapons, materials, technology, and the flight of nuclear scientists to other countries may
increase. A sharp drop in weapons research spending has left thousands of scientists,
engineers, and technicians in near poverty.20
•

Canada should work with other like-minded UN member states through the
International Scientific and Technical Center (ISTC) in the former Soviet Union to
provide Russian scientists with more long-term research grants and programs
that promote alternative civilian employment.21

•

Canada should also propose that an international registrar of scientists be set-up
through the UN to track the research activities of all scientists in the world. Similar
to the UN Arms Registrar, cooperation would have to be voluntary (in order to
preserve academic freedom). However, over time such a registrar could contribute to
increased transparency, openness, and scientific security.
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What can be done at the UN Security Council to further enhance Russia’s nuclear
stability? Much of the problem stems from Russia’s weakness, not its strength. As the
Russian Duma’s Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Defense, Alexei G. Arbatov,
asserted in the spring of 1998, “Not since 1941 has the Russian military stood as
perilously close to ruin as it does now…. If Russia’s mammoth military-industrial
establishment were to collapse—a distinct possibility in the new few years—the
consequences would be not less devastating than were the events of June 1941 [German
invasion], and not only for Russia but for the entire world.”22 High-level American
officials who have recently visited some Russian nuclear sites have also expressed strong
concerns about the safety of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Adding to fears is the prospect that
Russia has little time and comparatively few resources to deal with potential Year 2000
computer problems that might affect missile operations.23
•

The Canadian government should contribute at least one thousand computer
experts, along with substantial travel and research funds, to a large-scale UNsponsored initiative that would deploy knowledgeable computer personnel to Russia
to work on their military’s computer equipment.

•

The Canadian government should also press Russia to continue to centralize control
of its nuclear arsenal and consolidate nuclear weapons on Russian soil.

•

More technological and monetary assistance for Russia is necessary. The US has
already spent $1.6 billion to improve the safe storage of Russia’s nuclear materials,
provide assistance in transporting and dismantling nuclear weapons, and create new
research opportunities for Russia’s nuclear weapons specialists.24 The Canadian
government should promise an additional $50 million in order to avoid a nuclear
tragedy from occurring. It might also issue a challenge to other rich nations in the UN
Security Council, such as the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, to contribute
substantial amounts.

•

With like-minded nations, the government could also sponsor anti-leakage programs
at Russian nuclear facilities. As a non-nuclear player, Canada would be perceived as
a neutral third party genuinely interested in reducing leakage of information and
nuclear materials from Russian nuclear storage and launching sites.
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The Threat of Conventional Weapons Proliferation:
Canada is the seventh largest contributor in the world to the arms trade and arms
trafficking. Despite the end of the Cold War, it has an over-sized military industry that
promotes Canadian wares with zeal. The Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions are
engaged in regional arms races. Countries like Saudia Arabia are flush with petrodollars
and demand Canadian defence products. Canadian companies such as Bombardier,
General Motors, and Magellan Aerospace Corporation are contributing to the worldwide
arms race in acquiring conventional weapons.25
•

If Canada wants to continue sponsoring important disarmament measures at the UN,
it needs to actively discourage its own domestic manufacturing industries from
seeking military contracts in the Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern regions. Negative
inducements could include the elimination of government subsidies and grants
through the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), an Ottawa-based crown
corporation that assists Canadian companies with export sales to foreign governments
and international organizations. As well, the government needs to close loopholes
that permit tax breaks for research and development for military purposes.

•

Government trade missions and foreign service officers in DFAIT should also be
actively discouraged from promoting significant military industry contracts overseas.
Since the 1950s Canada has become an important supplier of assemblies,

components, and sub-components to arms manufacturers in the United States. Canada has
moved into the development of dual-use technologies and products.
•

Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s proposals to eliminate landmines and curtail
small arms have earned Canada widespread admiration. If Canada wants to continue
to be a respected proponent of disarmament and arms control initiatives at the UN,
then its defence industry production and the export of dual-use technologies need
to be curtailed. The Canadian government could also explore the development of a
multilateral database that could serve as a tracking and early warning system
for dual-use exports.26
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Canada’s Approach at the UN toward Worldwide Defence Spending
Maintain Low Levels of Defence Spending:
To some extent Canada can justify any exhortations it makes at the UN to
decrease worldwide defence spending because it has made a laudable effort to constrain
its own defence expenditures. The Canadian defence budget decreased from $12.83
billion in 1991-92, to $11.97 billion in 1993-94, to $9.9 billion in 1997-98. The end of
the Cold War, as well as Canada’s large debt and deficit justified these reductions.
However, high-level Americans, such as the US Ambassador to Canada, are already
emphasizing the need to increase overall military spending.27 Rather than sharply increase
defence spending on capital and equipment, Canadian Cabinet Ministers should take into
consideration that Canada would set a poor example which other states could follow.
•

Canada’s continuing fiscal problems, and its prominent role over the next eighteen
months at the UN, should constrain policy options. Increasing defence spending is
not an option for responsible policy-makers.

For many years, Canada’s defence spending has been less than 1.5 percent of GDP. In
1997, the United States spent 3.6 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on
defence while Canada spent 1.3 percent—approximately the same percentage as
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Spain.28 Canadian defence lobbyists bemoan the
country’s low level of spending but the European allies have similarly cut-back. In 1997,
each Canadian paid $274 (US) for defence while each American paid $838. But the
United States is a superpower with world-wide defence interests. Canada has a
population of barely 30 million yet spends more per capita on defence than Portugal,
Spain, and Turkey, and approximately the same as Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and
Italy.29
•

The government should be prepared to announce that it cannot afford to spend
more on defence at the same time as social and health care programmes continue to
be cut.
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The Worldwide Refugee Crisis: A Threat to International Security
Share the Burden and Help Reduce the Number of Refugees:
The world’s refugee population is fast becoming a crisis of epic proportions. At
present there are approximately 15 million official ‘refugees’ under the Geneva
Convention and similar arrangements. In addition, there are perhaps upward of 20 million
people who are not afforded the same official protection, but are ‘in refugee-like
situations’. Another, even larger category is that of the ‘internally displaced,’ whose
number has risen to perhaps 26 million or more—although statistics on this are
uncertain.30 Those who are forced to flee their homes require food and medical aid,
depress the living standards of local communities, may contribute to environmental
destruction, and can even encourage ethnic and cultural animosities. Most discouraging is
that if regional anarchy increases, as we have seen in the Balkans, the numbers of those
in flight will abruptly rise. Canada and the rest of the world community must help stem
the flow and alleviate suffering.
•

The Canadian government could help set up organized observer corps in countries
and along borders deemed to be a potential source of refugee-producing conflict. By
providing an early warning system of well-trained UN personnel, peace-promoting
measures could be introduced before individuals are forced to flee their homes. Some
developing countries perceive early warning as opening the door wide for Northern
interference in their internal affairs. But by trying to promote humanitarian early
warning, the Canadian government has been acting with foresight—at the same time
as government officials have been mindful that there were UN warnings of the
Rwanda disaster three years before it happened.

•

Another recommendation might be for Canada to work harder through the UN to
foster broad-based economic development, since the relationship of refugeeism to
underdevelopment is direct and undisputed.31 Lessening poverty will likely reduce
the number of refugees. Canada’s foreign aid budget now amounts to about 0.31
percent of the country’s economic output, down from 0.50 percent 10 years ago.
Once the fifth most generous of the world’s 21 richest nations, Canada now ranks
ninth. As the President of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation has
stated, “Given that we want to play an international leadership role, and given how
15

pleased we were to be elected to the [UN] Security Council, we should put in the
resources that would allow us to play that role.”32
•

Canada could also advocate establishing an organized system of burden sharing,
whereby all the world’s nations would contribute to supporting refugees by
allocating money to the countries that end up housing them. Despite internal
weaknesses, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and the UN Human Rights
Commissioner and Centre, deserve more widespread support. This would relieve
pressure on the poorest of Third World countries that are often overwhelmed by
refugee populations, despite their lack of resources.33

Conclusion:
Canada has limited time and a small window of opportunity to take advantage of
its prominent seat in the UN Security Council. It is highly unlikely that it will be reelected to the position for at least another ten years (e.g. until at least 2010). Currently,
the Liberal government under Jean Chretien is well-equipped to make important changes
to national and international security, in part because it has appointed a Foreign Minister
with a vision of the world as it could be, not as it is. In the tradition of many Canadian
idealists before him, such as former Minister of External Affairs Howard Green and
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Axworthy is seeking to strengthen the UN and work
toward peace and disarmament. Not everyone will agree on the best methods and most
efficient means of achieving these commonly-valued objectives. But Canada has a duty
and responsibility to put forward new ideas at the UN to enhance international and
national security. As Professor James Eayrs suggested over thirty years ago in Fate and
Will in Foreign Policy:
Force is the monopoly of the Great Powers, for all the good it does them. But
Great Powers enjoy no monopoly over ideas. The foreign minister of a small state
may not be able to summon a gunboat in aid of his diplomacy, to carry a big stick
let alone to brandish it. But he can carry a briefcase well enough, and stock it with
proposals.34

16

1

Erika Simpson, Canadian Leaders on NATO and the Bomb: Defenders confront Critics (unpublished

book manuscript under consideration at McGill-Queen’s University Press), 1999; Erika Simpson, “New
Ways of Thinking about Nuclear Weapons and Canada’s Defence Policy,” Diefenbaker’s Legacy, edited
by D.C. Story and R. Bruce Shepard, (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1998), p. 27-41; Erika
Simpson, “The Principles of Liberal Internationalism according to Lester B. Pearson,” Journal of
Canadian Studies (forthcoming), 31, no. 1, spring 1999.
2

There are fifteen seats on the Council including the permanent five—China, France, Russia, the United

Kingdom, an the United States—plus ten elected members. In 1999, these include Argentina, Bahrain,
Canada, Gambia, Gabon, Namibia, the Netherlands, Malaysia, and Slovenia.
3

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, The Dilemmas of a Committed

Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping, June 1993, 7.
4

5

Bill Robinson, “Exploding the Myths,” Ploughshares Monitor, March 1998, p. 17-18.
Common Security Consultants, [H. Peter Langille and Erika Simpson], A 1994 Blueprint for a Canadian

and International Peacekeeping Training Centre at CFB Cornwallis, (Halifax: Government of Nova
Scotia, 1994), 106 p., reprinted in Minutes of Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and
the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy, issue no. 21, June 14 1994, p. A1-123
and see Common Security Consultants and Stratman Consulting Inc. [Brigadier-General Clayton Beattie],
CFB Cornwallis: Canada's Peacekeeping Training Centre—A Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training
Centre of Excellence, (Halifax: Government of Nova Scotia, 1992), 70 p., reprinted in Minutes of
Proceedings of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, issue no. 45, 1 April
1993.
6

See for example, “Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada,” 1993, 106; “The Liberal Foreign

Policy Handbook,” 1993, Defence Section, n.p.; and Liberal Party of Canada, “A Record of Achievement:
A Report on the Liberal Government’s 36 Months in Office,” 1996, 113.
7

Roger Coate, ed., US Policy and the Future of the United Nations, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund

Press, 1994), 12.
8

Karsten Prager, “The Limits of Peacekeeping,” Time Magazine, 23 October 1995.

17

9

Allen Sens and Peter Stoett, Global Politics, (Scarborough, Ontario: ITP Nelson, 1998), 181.

10

Canadian Coast Guard, “Icebreaking Operations Service Dates” at http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/ice-

gla/servicedates.htm
11

Andrew McIntosh, “Submarines to come at a higher price,” National Post, 15 February 1999.

12

Peter Langille and Erika Simpson, “Should Canada buy the U.K. subs?” Ottawa Citizen, 4 March 1996.

13

AP Online, “Clinton would boost Military Money,” 19 January 1999.

14

Ambassador Gordon D. Giffin, “The Challenges of Shared Security,” Remarks to the Canadian Club of

Montreal, 11 January 1999.
15

Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada and the Nuclear

Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century,” (Ottawa:
Publications Service), December 1998.
16

Erika Simpson, “The Costs of NATO Expansion: What Alternatives Do We Have?” International

Journal, forthcoming, spring 1999; “The costs of NATO expansion for Canada,” Globe and Mail, 25 July
1997.
17

Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence, “The Report of the Special Senate Committee on

Security and Intelligence,” January 1999, p. 53-56.
18

Ann Denholm Crosby, “Defining Security Environments for Global Governance: Canada and the US

‘Global Protection System’,” Global Governance, 4, 1998, p. 331-353.
19

Center for Defense Information, “US-Russia Relations: Avoiding a New Cold War,” The Defense

Monitor, Washington, D.C., 28, Issue 5, 1998.
20

For example, see “Science in Russia: The diamonds in the rubble,” The Economist, 8 November 1997 at

http://www.istc.ru/n10.htm
21

Susan Eisenhower, “The Proliferation of Russian Know-How,” The Washington Post, 16 January 1998;

p. A21 at http://www.istc.ru/n12.htm. See also Victor Alessi and Ronald F. Lehman II, “Science in the
Pursuit of Peace: The Success and Future of the ISTC,” Arms Control Today, June/July 1998 at
http://www.istc.ru/n14.htm
22

Center for Defense Information, op. cit.

18

23

Michael Gordon, “Pentagon seeks Russian military’s participation in missile-warning system,” New York

Times Service, 22 February 1999.
24

Victor Alessi and Ronald F. Lehman II, op. cit., and Center for Defense Information, op. cit;

25

Ken Epps, “Canada’s Largest Military Contractors,” Project Ploughshares Monitor, December 1998.

26

A policy advocated by Keith Krause, Kenneth Epps, William Weston, David Mutimer, Constraining

Conventional Proliferation: A Role for Canada (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Canada) at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/disarm/cvsum1.htm
27

Ambassador Gordon D. Giffin, op. cit.; NATO Press Conference transcript, “Albright, Cohen, Berger

Brief on Summit, ” 8 July 1997 at www.nato.int/usa/specials/970708c/htm; US Department of State,
“Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale,
Benefits, Costs and Implications,” 24 February 1997, 2, 6, 14 at
www.state/gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#benefits
28

“Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” NATO Press Release, M-DPC-2(97)147, 2

December 1997, Table 3.
29

Ibid., Table 4.

30

Michael Shenstone, “World Population Growth and Movement: Towards the 21st Century,” (Ottawa:

DFAIT), no. SP80A, 30 June 1997, p. 10-11 and Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher “Refugee Flows as
Grounds for International Action,” International Security, 21, no. 1, September 1996, p. 46.
31

Shenstone, op. cit. p. 32.

32

Betty Plewes quoted in Marcus Gee, “Canada urged to raise level of foreign aid to poor countries,” Globe

and Mail, 27 October 1998.
33

Michael Shenstone, op. cit. p. 32-33.

34

James Eayrs, Fate and Will in Foreign Policy, (Toronto: Seven talks for the Canadian Broadcasting

Corporation), p. 84.

19

